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We develop an overlapping generations model with asset and capital accumula-
tion to analyze the interaction between the real economy and international asset
markets. The world consists of two homogenous countries with an integrated as-
set market, which dier only in levels of their capital stock. Two period lived
consumers transfer wealth over time and across countries by holding international
assets with stochastic dividends. Short sale of assets allows poor economy to take
credit for productive investment. Yet, risk aversion and expectations may preclude
capital stock of both countries from converging while capital ows from the rich
to the poor country. The poor country needs suciently high capital stock ini-
tially to catch up with the rich country. Cycles in capital stocks and international
capital ows occur.
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How does trading in an international asset market inuence the capital accumulation
of countries? The conventional wisdom suggests that international nancial markets
allocate the savings of the integrated economies to its most protable use. Suppose the
world consists of identical countries which dier only in levels of their capital stock.
A standard neoclassical technology implies a capital ow from rich countries to poor
countries so long until the rate of return in all countries are equalized. In fact, a perfect
international capital market implies an immediate adjustment of per capita income
across countries. However, as Lucas put it \Why doesn't capital ow from rich to poor
countries?" (see Lucas (1990)). In his paper he discusses why capital does not ow from
rich to poor countries to the extent a standard neoclassical model would predict.
Responding to Lucas' paradox, the neoclassical growth models have been revised to
include mainly aspects of heterogeneity, human capital, income distribution and capital
market imperfections (for a survey see Galor (1996)). These extended models show
that the neoclassical framework with constant return to scale and diminishing marginal
product is consistent with club convergence. In other words their economic system
can be characterized by multiple, locally stable steady states. However, most of these
models are closed economy models without explicitly modelled international capital
markets. Notable exceptions are the one sector overlapping generations model modied
to incorporate capital market imperfections by Boyd & Smith (1997) and Matsuyama
(2004).1 They show that the unrestricted international nancial ow precludes countries
from converging.
Instead of assuming capital market imperfections the present paper modies the overlap-
ping generations model by introducing international assets agents can trade to transfer
their wealth over time in addition to investment in the capital market. The world con-
sists of two homogenous countries with an integrated asset market, which dier only
in levels of their capital stock. The asset market is modelled as in B ohm & Chiarella
(2005) in which asset prices are determined explicitly by the interaction of the behav-
ior of investors using a specic forecasting rule. The income stream is endogenous so
that the factor prices are determined by their respective marginal products. Assets pay
1It is well known that in the one sector overlapping generations model multiple steady states could
emerge if the wage function is not a concave function of capital labor ratio. They do not rely on this
result.
1random dividends so that agents' attitude towards risk plays a crucial role in the port-
folio decision. Agents are allowed to sell assets short. As asset demand is increasing in
the capital stock, short selling implies nancial ows from the rich country to the poor
country. Suppose the world consists of two identical countries which dier only in their
stocks of capital. Then, the rate of return in the poor country is higher than in the
rich country. This induces the rich country to hold more assets which in turn causes
a reduction in the capital stock. Short sale of assets allows the poor country in turn
to take credit to invest in the capital market. Yet, risk aversion and expectations may
preclude capital stock of both countries from converging while capital ows from the
rich to the poor country. In contrast to Boyd & Smith (1997) and Matsuyama (2004),
the asymmetric steady state does not result from imperfections imposed in the capital
market but from uncertainty caused by the randomness in the asset market. In other
words, interactions of optimal behavior of agents with dierent income may generate an
asymmetric steady state. The poor country is better o while the rich country is worse
o than in an economy without asset. Furthermore, Boyd & Smith (1997) motivate their
paper by referring to cyclicality of credit allocation between developing and developed
economies in empirical data. However, their theoretical ndings are conned to a dy-
namical equilibrium paths displaying damped oscillation. The asymmetric steady state
generated in the present paper undergoes a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. This implies
cycles in capital stock as well as international capital ows in the long run in contrast to
the transitory feature in Boyd & Smith (1997). The reminder of the paper is organized
as follows. Section 2 denes the behavior of consumers and producers identical across
countries. Section 3 and 4 describe the closed economy model and two country model in
general. Section 5 analyzes the steady state properties of the closed economy model and
the two country model using a quadratic production function. Section 6 complements
the analysis of section 5 by numerical simulations. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Structure
Consider an overlapping generations economy evolving in discrete time. In addition to
the markets for output, labor, and capital there is a market for assets. Each generation
consisting of homogenous consumers lives for two periods and we assume that there is
no population growth. All markets operate under perfect competition implying that the
agents are price takers.
22.1 The Consumption Sector
The typical young consumer in period t = 0 supplies one unit of labor inelastically in
the rst period of his life time and receives labor income w in units of consumption good
which is the numeraire good.2 His lifetime utility depends on old age consumption only.
There is no storage possibilities for the consumption goods. He can transfer his wage
income to the next period either by investing in production as capital or by purchasing
assets. The young agent can not take credit in the capital market. In the second period
of his life time when old, the agent receives the rate of return R1 on his investment y
and a random dividend "1 on his share holdings x, which he resells in the market. The
following assumptions characterize the consumers.
Assumption 1 Consumers have risk preferences over the mean  and the standard
deviation  of his future consumption/wealth described by a utility function
U :
(
R+  R+ ! R
(;) 7! U(;)
which is increasing in the mean  and decreasing in the standard deviation .
Let (x;y) 2 R  R+ denote a portfolio of assets and capital investment and let p 2 R+
denote current price of risky assets in units of the numeraire commodity. The budget
constraint requires
w = px + y:
The investor's wealth in the following period t = 1 is given by
W(w;p;x;R1;p1;"1) = R1(w   px) + (p1 + "1)x:
When making the portfolio decision, next period's rate of return on capital, equity
price and dividend (R1;p1;"1) are uncertain for young agents. It is assumed that they
make point forecasts (Re;pe) for the rate of return and the asset price. In addition,
the following assumption is made about the expectation on the next period's dividend
payment "1.
2For ease of notation the time index t will be suppressed unless necessary. Variables without time
subscript refer to an arbitrary period t while subscript 1 refers to period t + 1 and  1 to period t   1.
3Assumption 2 Consumers are endowed with a subjective probability distribution  2
P(R+) for next period's dividend payment parameterized by a pair (E["];V["]) 2 R+
R++ of expected value and variance.
Then, for any asset portfolio x 2 R the subjectively expected value of his future wealth
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where pe +E["] Rep is the expected risk premium. The young agent's objective is to
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2.2 The Production Sector
There is a single innitely lived rm in the economy which uses labor L = 1 and capital
K to produce consumption goods. The aggregate production function is given by
F(K;1) + " x;
where F is homogenous of degree one and " x is stochastic prot paid to shareholders as
dividend. Then the intensive form can be written as
f(k) + " x:
where k = K as L = 1. In the overlapping generations structure the young generations
are the shareholders of the rm. The labor and capital markets are assumed to be
competitive such that the rm pays the wage w(k) = f(k)   kf0(k) and the rate of
return on capital investment f0(k) according to the marginal product rule.
4Assumption 3 The production function in the intensive form f : R+ ! R+ is C2
and f0(k) > 0 > f00(k) and satises the Inada conditions limk!1 f0(k) = 0 and
limk!0 f0(k) = 1.
Assumption 4 " is an i.i.d random variable with nite rst and second moments. We
assume that the agents have an unbiased prediction for the rst and second moments in
the sense of B ohm & Wenzelburger (2002). This implies the rst two moments of the




where E["] is the mean value of the random variable " and
V["]
! = V["];
where V["] is the variance of the random variable ".
3 The Closed Economy model
We assume that the amount of risky assets is given exogenously in the economy.3 In the
overlapping generation structure this implies that all the assets sold by old consumers
are bought by young investors.
3.1 Temporary Equilibrium
Let the preference of an investor be given by the linear mean variance function of future
wealth




where  is usually interpreted as a measure of risk aversion. Then, the asset demand of












3We do not address the issue of how rms decision to raise capital inuence the economy but focus
on the spill over eects of consumption decision on capital accumulation.
5The price law is implicitly dened by the solution p = S(pe;Re;k) of
'(p
e;R
e;p;k) =  x (3)
where  x denotes the constant supply of the risky asset.
Assumption 5 The risk adjusted expected cum-dividend price has to be greater than
zero, i.e. pe+c > 0 where c := E["]  xV["] which can be interpreted as risk adjusted
dividend payment.










The assertion in Proposition 1 is obvious as the asset demand function '(pe;Re;p;k) is
decreasing in p and '(pe;Re;0;k) =
pe+E["]
V["] . 
Note that in equilibrium there is no short sale in the asset market as the young consumers
are homogenous. The capital investment is dened by the wage minus purchases of risky
assets. We assume that the capital investment is reversible. Then the depreciated capital
is paid back as a part of rate of return on capital investment. The evolution of capital
is given by
k1 = w(k)    xp: (5)
Equation (4) and (5) dene the temporal equilibrium given expectations.
3.2 Expectations
Given the equation (5) for capital accumulation, the rate of return on capital at t = 1
is given by
R1 = R(k;p) := f
0(w(k)    xp) + 1   : (6)
The perfect prediction at t = 0 for the rate of return on capital at t = 1 requires
R
e ! = R(k;p) (7)
The perfect predictor at t = 0 for the asset price in t = 1 is implicitly dened by the








6Substituting (7) into (8) we obtain a perfect predictor for the asset price consistent with
a perfect prediction for the rate of return on capital dened in the following Proposition.
Note that given the perfect prediction for the rate of return on capital, the asset demand
now becomes dependent on wage income in general. This also implies that the price law
is dependent wage income in general.
Proposition 2 Suppose pe
 1 2 R+. There exist a unique perfect predictor for asset price





















where h(k) is implicitly dened by 	(pe
 1;R(k;p);k) = 0.
Proof is provided in Appendix. 
Given perfect prediction for the next period's asset price and the rate of return, a price
map along which a perfect point prediction is guaranteed is given by
p1 = 	(p;k) := p(f
0 (w(k)    xp) + 1   )   c: (10)
Equations (5) and (10) dene the dynamical system for the closed economy model under
rational expectations.
4 Two country model
In this section we assume that the world economy consists of two countries inhabited
by homogenous consumers. The production technologies in both countries are assumed
to be also identical making two countries distinguished only by the stock of capital.
The asset markets of two countries are integrated into an international market while
there exist capital markets in both countries. We assume that when young consumers
buy assets in the international market, they do not distinguish between assets of two
countries. We also assume that consumers can not invest in the capital market abroad.
In other words, we rule out foreign direct investment. Therefore, the only channel
between capital accumulation in each country is the international asset market. Since
young consumers can be shareholders of foreign rms, capital investment is no longer
7independent of asset demand as it was in the closed economy model where constant
stocks of assets were transferred from old to young within an country. In turn, the asset
demand is dependent on wage income given rational expectation generating a feedback
eect between asset demand and capital accumulation in both countries. Dierent wage
incomes in both countries enable short selling at equilibrium in the international asset
market. In such an equilibrium, the international asset market serves as an international
credit market inducing trading of consumption commodities across countries.
4.1 Temporary Equilibrium in the International Asset Market






Since the productivity shocks in two countries are both i.i.d. random variables drawn














respectively. Assuming unbiased predictions for the rst and second moments as before,












The evolution of capital in each country is now dependent on asset demand and is given
by
k1 = w(k)   xp: (15)
Then, the rate of return on capital in t = 1 in each country is given by
R1 = R(k;x;p) := f
0(w(k)   xp) + 1   : (16)
4For ease of notation we suppress the superscript i = 1;2 denoting the individual country unless
necessary.
8Substituting equation (16) into equation (14) we implicitly obtain the asset demand
consistent with a perfect foresight for the rate of return on capital in t = 1. If the
budget constraint is binding, the asset demand is independent of expectations and given
by
w(k)
p . If the budget constraint is not binding, the asset demand is implicitly dened
by the solution x = x(pe;k;p) of
x =
pe + E["]   R(k;x;p)p
V["]
: (17)
The following Proposition characterizes the asset demand function consistent with per-
fect foresight for the rate of return on capital.
Proposition 3 The asset demand is decreasing in p i.e., @
@px(pe;k;p)  0 if and only
if ER;x(k;x;p)   1 where ER;x(k;x;p) denotes the elasticity of expected rate of return








f0(w(k)   xp) + (1   )
: (18)
Furthermore, ER;x(k;x;p) >  1 implies p 2 P where P := fp 2 R+jx(pe;p;k) < 0g.
Proof is provided in Appendix. 
The Proposition 3 states that the asset demand can be increasing in price if there is











Setting the demand of two countries equal to the total supply of assets, the price law is





2) = 2 x: (20)
Proposition 4 There exist a unique market clearing price dened implicitly by equation




@p(pe;k2;p) < 0. Otherwise, there exist multiple market
clearing prices. Furthermore, '(pe;k1;p) < '(pe;k2;p) implies k1 < k2 in equilibrium.
Proof is provided in Appendix. 
9Given results in Proposition 3, the Proposition 4 implies that there may exist multiple
market clearing asset prices if there is short selling in the market. In equilibrium,
it is only the poor country that sells short. Equations (15), (19) and the price law
p = S(pe;k1;k2) dened by equation (20) dene the temporal equilibrium at t = 0 given
expectation for asset price at t = 1.
4.2 Expectations and Dynamical System








Proposition 5 Suppose (pe;k1;k2) 2 R3
+. There exist a unique perfect predictor con-















. The perfect predictor is positive if c  0 and if

















From Proposition 3 we know that @G
@p(pe;p) may be positive for some interval whereas
@G
@pe(pe;p) > 0. Hence, @
@p	(pe;k1;k2) < 0 for that interval. For c > 0 the predictor may
be negative for some interval as 	(0;k1;k2) =  c. 
The perfect forecasting rule for the rate of return in both countries is implicitly dened





 x   R1e R2e
2V["]  p






 x   R2e R1e
2V["]  p

+ 1   :
(22)
These equations have a unique solutions as the left hand side is positive for Rie = 0,
decreasing with respect to Rie and goes to zero as Rie ! 1, 8i = 1;2.
10The dynamical system of the two country model under rational expectations is charac-
terized by
k1













p1 = 	(p;k1;k2) :=
R1(k1;k2;p)+R2(k1;k2;p)
2  p   c:
(23)
Proposition 6 There exist unique positive symmetric steady states with rational expec-
tations which coincides with the unique positive steady states of the closed economy.
The proof follows directly from equations (22) and (22) as well as equations in (23).
5 Quadratic Production Function Case
As it is shown in the previous section we can not globally derive an unbiased predictor
for the asset price when the budget constraints are binding. Even for the unconstrained
asset demand an unbiased predictor can only be derived globally when c  0. This is a
general feature of the CAPM models as in B ohm, Deutscher & Wenzelburger (2000) and
B ohm & Chiarella (2005) for a given positive return on riskless assets. To investigate the
existence of steady states under rational expectation5 and their stability properties we
use a specic production function. The quadratic production function has a technically
convenient property that the rst derivative is a linear function.6 This linearity of the




Ak(2d   k) if k < d
Ad2 if k  d:
(24)
Figure 1 illustrates the quadratic production function with the associated wage function.
Notice that the wage function is not globally concave. This is crucial for the existence
of multiple steady states as we see later.
5More specically by rational expectation we mean an unbiased prediction and/or a perfect predic-
tion whenever available.






Figure 1: Quadratic Production Function
5.1 Dynamics in the Closed Economy
Using the quadratic production function we can solve explicitly for the dynamical system
under rational expectation given by
p1 = 	(p;k) := p(f
0(w(k)   p x) + 1   )   c (25)
k1 = (p;k) := w(k)    xp: (26)
The following Proposition characterizes the stability property of all steady states.
Proposition 7 If c > 0, there exist at most two steady states. Both of them are unstable
and k < d. If c  0, there exist two steady states if (Ad2   d) >  c x. One is unstable
and k < d. The other is stable and k  d.
Proof is provided in Appendix. 
5.2 Dynamics in the Two Country Model
The asset demand and the unbiased predictor is derived for the quadratic production
function case in the Appendix. From Proposition 6 we know that the symmetric steady
state of the two country model is identical to the steady state of the closed economy
model. So the existence of the symmetric steady sate is already characterized by Propo-
sition 7. The following Proposition gives a condition of when two countries convergence
to the symmetric steady state.
12Proposition 8 There exist a positive symmetric steady state k1 = k2 = Ad2    xc
 for
c  0 and (Ad2   d) >  c x. If k1 = k2 or k1;k2 > d the world economy converges to
this symmetric steady state from around its neighborhood.
Proof is provided in Appendix. 
Note that there are no nancial ows between countries at symmetric steady states.
Denition 1 We call an asymmetric steady state an inventive compatible trading steady
state if the budget constraint is not binding for the asset demand in both rich and poor
country and if there are nancial ows between both countries.
Proposition 9 There exist incentive compatible trading asymmetric steady states in
which k2 < d < k1 and x2 < 0 < x1.
The Proposition implies w(k1) > I(k1) > I(k2) > w(k2) at the asymmetric steady states
where I(ki) := w(ki)   pxi;8i = 1;2 denotes the capital investment in each countries.
This means the poor country requires external nance from the rich country in form of
short selling in the international asset market for its capital investment.
Proposition 10 The poor country is better o while the rich country is worse o at
the incentive compatible trading steady state than in economy without an asset market.
Proof is provided in Appendix. 
6 Numerical Simulation
The quadratic production function is used throughout the numerical analysis. To obtain
an unbiased prediction for the rst and second moment of the next period's dividend
payment, the following assumption is made about the random variable ".
Assumption 6 We assume that the random variable " has a uniform distribution on




> > > <
> > > :
0 if " < a
1
b a if a  "  b
0 if " > b
(27)
13with a mean a+b
2 and a variance
(b a)2
12 .
The rst general observation is that the dynamical system converges to a symmetric
steady state for a wide range of parameter sets for relatively low V["]. This means that
if the young consumers hypothesize a relatively low risk, the international asset market
induces equalizing forces for the capital accumulation in both countries. Especially,
a zero risk induces the rate of return on capital investment in both countries to be
identical. In other words a zero risk implies that the non arbitrage condition has to hold
between the expected return in the international asset market and the expected return
in the domestic capital market. This means that the dynamical system for zero risk
degenerates to the dynamical system of a closed economy. Therefore, in this section we




0 = 3 as the standard parameter set to analyze the
dynamic behavior of the system. Figure 2 shows a bifurcation diagram with respect
to the depreciation rate . It shows that the asymmetric steady state k1 < d < k2
described in proposition 9 is stable for an open parameter set. In other words there












Figure 2: Bifurcation Diagram
Proposition 11 The incentive compatible trading asymmetric steady states k2 < d < k1
go through a supercritical Neimark-Sacker bifurcation.
Proof is provided in the Appendix. 
The steady state k2 < d < k1 loses its stability and a closed invariant curve appears
which is shown in Figure 3 (a). Figure 3 (b) shows the corresponding time series. The
14dynamical system switches from the case where k2 < d < k1 to the case where k1;k2 < d
























Figure 3:  = 0:575
Figure 4 shows the basin of attraction for the asymmetric steady states at  = 0:625.












Figure 4: Basin of attraction  = 0:625
We know from proposition 8 that there exist no positive symmetric steady state for
c > 0 and there exist a positive stable symmetric steady state for c  0. The white color
depicts the initial values for which the dynamical system explodes. This suggests that
the risk adjusted expected dividend c plays a crucial role on the stability of steady states.
Intuitively the risk premium has to be positive for a country to invest in the international
asset market. Therefore, ceteris paribus the stability of the asymmetric steady state
requires a high expected dividend. Figure 5 compares the capital accumulation law (47)
with the capital accumulation law at the incentive compatible trading steady state. The
gure shows that the non concavity of the wage function together with short selling is
15responsible for the existence of the asymmetric steady state. The horizontal green line
depicts the map of the rich country while the other green curve depicts the map of the
poor country. The positive intercept of the map at k = 0 arises from short selling and
the convexity from the wage function.














Figure 5: Time Map: A = 0:5;d = 3:2; = 1;x = 1; = 0:5.
7 Concluding Remarks
The neoclassical growth model with a perfect international nancial market predicts im-
mediate convergence of capital stocks across countries given common production tech-
nology world wide. One way of resolving this paradox is to introduce some kind of
imperfections in the nancial market. In the present paper we ruled out foreign direct
investment to focus on the role of international asset markets for the convergence of per
capita income across countries. We introduced an international asset market in which
the equilibrium price is determined endogenously by the demand behavior of consumers
in two countries. If the consumers are not allowed to go short in the international asset
market, the market only serves to transfer their wealth over time not over countries.
However, short selling in the international asset market induces capital ows between
countries by enabling the young consumers in two countries to trade real commodities
between them. Short sale of assets allows the poor country to take credit implying
capital ows from the rich to the poor country. We would expect the two countries to
converge to a symmetric steady state through this mechanism. However, as the con-
sumers trade capital across two countries only through the international asset market,
their credit demand is bounded above by the risk adjusted price expectation in the asset
16market. In this way credit taking is not restricted by the wealth of the country as in the
models with nancial market imperfections but by the risk adjusted price expectations
of consumers in the asset market. This together with a non-concave wage function pre-
cludes capital stock of two countries from converging. Moreover, cycles in capital stocks
and international capital ows we observed in the present paper seem to have a wide
empirical support.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2






Gpe. Gp < 0 and Gpe > 0 if '(qe;p;k) =
qe Rep
V["] . If '(qe;p;k) =
w(k)
p , p =
w(k)
 x and
Gpe = 0. Furthermore, 	(0;kt) =  c. 
Proof of Proposition 3
There exist a unique solution to the equation (17) since the right hand side is positive
for p = 0 and is decreasing in x. If p = 0, x(qe;k;p) =
qe
V["]. Let G(x;p) := x  
qe R(w(k) xp)p
V["] . By the Implicit Function Theorem @x
@p =  
Gp(x;p)
Gx(x;p) where Gp(x;p) =
f0(w(k) px)+1 
V["]   xp 
f00(w(k) px)
V["] T 0 and Gx(x;p) = 1   p2 
f00(w(k) px)
V["] > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 4
The demand function is increasing in k. This implies there exist a critical value of
p at which the country with less capital stock rst start selling short. If the other
country start selling short, the aggregate demand is negative and there does not exist a
supporting price. 
17Proof of Proposition 7









This excludes any positive steady states (p;k) where k > d and p > 0 for c > 0. If
c  0 there exist a unique positive steady state (p;k) if Ad2 d
 x >  c
. The system in the
neighborhood of the steady state is given by
p1 = 	(p;k) := (1   )p   c (30)
k1 = (p;k) := Ad








The determinant is zero and the trace is 1   . The eigenvalues are 0 and 1   . Thus
the steady state where k > d is stable.
For k < d, the steady state is dened by





The system in the neighborhood of the steady state is given by




2    xp) + 1   

  c (34)
k1 = (p;k) := Ak
2    xp: (35)
The gure 6 shows there exist at most two steady states if c > 0 and there exists always








The determinant is 4A2k(d k)+2Ak(1 ) > 0 and the trace is 2A(d+  xp) > 0. The
trace can be rewritten as 2A(d   k) + 2A2k2 + 1   . We know that at positive steady
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(b) c  0
Figure 6: Steady States
Derivation of the asset demand in the two country model
The unconstrained asset demand function of each country with the perfect foresight for
interest factor is implicitly dened by the solution x(pe;k;p) of
x =
qe   (f0(w(k)   px) + 1   )p
V["]
:
The asset demand function of each country can be dened as the following.
If w(k) < d,





V["]+2Ap2 if qe < b(k;p)
w(k)
p if qe  b(k;p)
(37)
where R(k) := 2A(d k)+1  with slight abuse of notation and b(k;p) :=
w(k)V["]
p +
2Adp + (1   )p > 0 denotes the expected cum dividend price above which the budget
constraint is binding.
19If w(k)  d,
x = '(p;pe;k) :=
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
qe (1 )p
V["] if qe < z(k;p)
qe R(w(k))p
V["]+2Ap2 if z(k;p)  qe < b(k;p)
w(k)




p + (1   )p. 
Derivation of the perfect predictor in the two country model
Let the world capital investment be denoted by I(k2;k2) := w(k1) + w(k2)   2 xp.
The Case w(k1)  w(k2) < d
If qe  b(ki;p);8i = 1;2:, the budget constraint is binding and irrespective to expected





From equation (37), we know there are two possible cases.













  c if b(k1;p)  qe < b(k2;p):
The case w(k2)  w(k1) < d can be obtained analogously.
The Case d  w(k1)  w(k2)
If b(ki;p)  qe;8i = 1;2:, the budget constraint is binding and irrespective to expected





From equation (38), we know there are ve possible cases.
20p1 = 	(p;k1;k2) :=
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
(1   )p   c if qe < z(k1;p)
2A xp2 +
R(w(k1))+R(w(k2))
2 p   c if z(k2;p)  qe < b(k1;p)
V["]A(d w(k2)+ xp)p













  c if b(k1;p)  qe ^ z(k2;p)  qe < b(k2;p):
The case d  w(k2)  w(k1) can be obtained analogously.
The Case w(k1) < d  w(k2)
If b(ki;p)  qe;8i = 1;2: the budget constraint is binding and irrespective to expected





We do not have to consider the case b(k2;p)  qe < b(k1;p). qe < b(k1;p) can be
rewritten as qe <
w(k1)V["]
p + 2Adp + (1   )p  b(k2;p) which is a contradiction.
From equation (37) and (38), we know there are four possible cases.
p1 = 	(p;k1;k2) :=
8
> > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > :
V["]A(d w(k1)+ xp)p
V["]+Ap2 + (1   )p   c if qe < b(k1;p) ^ qe < z(k2;p)
2A xp2 +
R(w(k1))+R(w(k2))













  c if b(k1;p)  qe ^ z(k2;p)  qe < b(k2;p):
The case w(k2) < d  w(k1) can be obtained analogously. 
21Proof of Proposition 8
If k1 = k2 < d, the dynamical system reduces to a two dimensional system given by
k1 = (p;k) := Ak
2    xp
p1 = 	(p;k) := f
0(Ak
2    xp)p + (1   )p   c:
If k1;k2  d, the dynamical system reduces to a two dimensional system given by
k1 = (p;k) := Ad
2    xp
p = 	(p;k) := f
0(Ak
2    xp)p + (1   )p   c:
From proposition 7 we know that there exist the stable steady state Ad2   xc
 if and only
if c  0 and (Ad2   d) >  c x. 
Proof of Proposition 9




















p = p(A(d   k
2) + 1   )   c (41)
From (41),
k
























The gure shows the intersections of the equation (42) and (43) for  xV["] > c >
0;Ad > 1.




















Figure 7: Asymmetric Steady States
k1 > d requires Ad2 + A(k2)2   2p x > d + k2. For suciently high d this inequality is
satised. Suppose the asset demand of the country 2 is positive at above steady states.
This means  x  
p+c
V["] > 0 =) p <
 xV["] c
 . However, p 
 xV["] c
 at the asymmetric
steady states. This is a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 10
Suppose k2 < k1. From Proposition 9, we know x1 > 0 > x2 at the incentive compatible
trading asymmetric steady state. The capital stock of both poor and rich country at










Then, at the asymmetric steady state, 0 < k2 < k1 < Ad2. Suppose there exist no asset
market. Then the evolution of capital accumulation in an economy is given by
k1 = w(k) =
(
Ak2 if k < d
Ad2 if k  d:
(47)
The economy without an asset market has three steady states, 0;1=A and Ad2. The
steady state 1=A is unstable since the function w(k) cuts the 45 degree line from below.
23Hence, the capital stock of the poor country would be k = 0 and that of the rich country
k = Ad2 at steady state.

Proof of Proposition 11


















































































































The determinant and the trace of the above 2  2 matrix is
det =
2A2k2(d   A(k2)2 + p x)2V["]4





A2(k2)2p2 + (d + 2(k2 + p x))V["]
(A(pe)2 + V["])2  




(1   )(2V["]4 + 2AV["]p2 + A2p2)
(Ap2 + V["])2
24The points (a), (b) and (c) in Figure 8 corresponds to  = (0:625;0:594719;0:575) in
Figure 2. As the value of  decreases from 0:625 to 0:575 the determinant crosses 1 at
 = 0:594719 which proofs that the system goes through a Neimark Sacker bifurcation.


















Figure 8: Stability triangle

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